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Some unpleasant arithmetics of regional unemployment in the EU. 
Are there any lessons for EMU? 
Lucio R. Pench, Paolo Sestito and Elisabetta Frontini* 
Summary 
Several studies have documented the weak response of regional wage differentials and labour mobility 
following region-specific ("idio.1yncratic ") shocks in the average of the EU countries. This has been often 
taken as evidence of the rigidity of labour markets in European countries, as opposed to the flexibility of the 
USA. However, as such shocks by definition average to zero, one cannot make an explicit link between the 
(lack of) adjustment at regional level and aggregate unemployment. Moreover, the emphasis on the reaction 
to short-run idiosyncratic shocks is unlikely to explain the permanent differentials across regions, which 
characterise the regional distribution of unemployment in many EU countries. This paper tries to provide a 
better understanding of the regional distribution of unemployment and why region-specific shocks can 
matter for aggregate unemployment. It does so by explicitly considering the possibility of asymmetric 
reactions, so that unemployment rises more in poorer areas suffering an adverse shock than it declines in 
richer regions experiencing a favourable shock. The reason behind such asymmetries is the presence of a 
wage floor in the poorer regions resulting from policy centralisation, as for instance in the case of a national 
unemployment compensation system, which provides benefits that are uniform across regions. If such a 
mechanism is at work, aggregate unemployment tends to be "inflated" by region-specific shocks that are 
inequality-increasing. After presenting an illustrative model of the mechanism, the paper proposes a simple 
measure of the resulting "excess unemployment ", based on the difference between the average (national) 
unemployment rate and the unemployment rate of the median region. It also examines the relationship 
between regional asymmetries in unemployment and the dispersion of productivity across regions, taken as 
proxy of the inequality-increasing shocks. The evidence, while not entirely conclusive, justifies two tentative 
policy conclusions, which are particularly relevant in the context of EMU: a) to avoid centralisation of 
labour market institutions at the EU level that may end up inflating aggregate unemployment; b) to 
effectively deploy regional policies to combat inequality- increasing shocks. 
Lucio R. Pench is advisor, Forward Studies Unit; Paolo Sestito is economic advisor, Directorate General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs; Elisabetta Frontini was with the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs. The authors would 
like to thank M. Buti for useful discussions and M. Hallett, lvo Maes and Notis Lebessis for valuable comments. They also 
thank Werner Grunewald (Eurostat) for useful advice. Finally, they thank Giuseppe Taglialatela for assistance with the 
calculations and Pamela Cranston for her editorial support. 
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Introduction 
Europe is often characterised as a high-unemployment area in contrast with the full-employment economy of 
the United States. This is a partial picture. It is well known that EU countries differ substantially in terms of 
labour market performance. These differences are in turn correlated to different institutional features, which 
are often linked with each other 1 • 
Also well known, but less studied in connection with overall employment performance, is the fact that in 
several EU countries national rates of unemployment average out large regional differences. A re-
examination of these regional differences, and their role in explaining overall employment perfom1ance, is 
the focus of this paper. 
Econometric analyses of regional unemployment tend to study the response of wages, employment and 
unemployment to idiosyncratic (i.e., region-specific) shocks. This allows gaining a better understanding of 
the mechanism leading to the persistence of unemployment in many European countries. However, as 
idiosyncratic shocks are assumed to average out to zero, these analyses do not add to our knowledge of the 
regional determinants of the long-term or "natural" rate of unemployment at aggregate level. One fact in 
particular calls for a different approach: regional rankings in the national unemployment leagues tend to be 
stable over time. This points to differences in the underlying determinants of the natural rate at regional 
level. In tum, these differences cannot be solely reduced to those institutional features (for example, labour 
market regulations, bargaining structure) that are usually considered when explaining different 
unemployment outcomes across countries. This is because such institutional features tend to be fixed at 
national level and hence to be the same across regions. 
This paper explores the possibility of a direct link between regional disparities and the aggregate rate of 
unemployment. Such a link depends on the existence of non-linearities and/or asyn1metries in the response to 
shocks. We suggest that "excessively" homogeneous labour market institutions may be responsible for non-
linearities in the response of employment to labour demand shocks, as they tend to create nation-wide wage 
floors, which are binding for the less productive regions. Therefore, the larger the productivity differentials 
across regions, the more likely that the aggregate rate of unemployment will be "inflated" by high 
unemployment in the poorer regions. 
The paper presents a systematic analysis of the regional dimension of unemployment in the EU. To this end 
we selected the most detailed level of disaggregation available for each EU country (NUTS3), so that 
regional differences can be observed also in the smaller countries (Luxembourg is not included). In the first 
section we provide some stylised facts on regional unemployment. It will be shown that many EU countries 
are characterised by large and persistent regional differentials. Moreover, the regional factor turns out to be a 
significant determinant of unemployment dispersion also in relation to other traditional cuts (by sex, age 
etc.). The second section briefly reviews the literature on European unemployn1ent and the regions. This 
literature tends to focus on the (lack of) short-term reactions to region-specific demand shocks that are 
assumed to have no effect in the aggregate (that is, the increases in unemployment occurring in the regions 
hit by adverse shocks are offset by definition by the reductions occurring in the regions experiencing 
favourable shocks). In so doing, this literature may fail to explain why in most countries high-unemployment 
regions tend to be the same over time. It may also fail to capture the aggregate effects of the wage rigidities 
described at the regional level. The third section presents a simple model in which region-specific shocks do 
have effects in the aggregate. It also suggests a few features of the regional distribution of unemployment 
Different institutional features can be viewed as a direct cause of differences in the equilibrium rate of unemployment (see, for 
instance, Nickell, 1997). Alternati ve ly, they can be seen as the source of quasi-hysteresis phenomena, in which , following the 
same type of shock, the unemployment rate drifts upwards in some countries, but not in others, depending on the institutional 
set-up (see, for instance, Blanchard, 1998). For a summary of the main explanations of European unemployment and a review of 
some institutional features see Buti, Pench and Sestito ( 1998), which also contains a sketch of some of the ideas developed in 
this paper. 
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and productivity that may be relevant for empirical analysis. These empirical features - specifically, an 
indicator of asymmetry in the distribution of unemployment and various measures of correlation between 
productivity and unemployment - are examined in the fourth section. A final section provides some policy 
conclusions. It presents some reflections on the implications of these regional problems for EMU and the 
policies required to deal with them. 
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1. The regional dimension of unemployment in the EU 
In order to carry out our analysis we considered the NUTS3 level of regional disaggregation. This represents 
a departure from the prevailing empirical literature, which usually considers data at a more aggregate level, 
thus leaving aside small countries for which such level of aggregation does not apply. The details of the 
regional breakdown are spelled out in the Appendix. The number of regions included in each country varies 
from about 10 for the smaller countries to 30-40 for the larger countries. In total there are 232 regions. The 
period considered ranges from the early '80s (1983) to the mid-90s (1996) so as to cover more than one 
cycle, with a number of limitations due to the availability of data for some countries. 
A preliminary examination of the regional unemployment data concerns three aspects: the extent of the 
differentials in unemployment within each country over time; the degree of regional persistence of 
unemployment; the importance of regional differentials in explaining the overall dispersion of 
unemployment. The main facts can be summarised as follows. 
Regional differentials in unemployment are large in most European countries, with some countries 
exhibiting a tendency toward increasing regional divergence. 
Graph 1 provides a summary of the evolution of regional differentials in unemployment since the 1980s. It 
compares, for each country and for each year, the average unemployment rate in: the high-unemployment 
regions (top quartile of the unemployment distribution), the low-unemployment regions (bottom quartile of 
the unemployment distribution), and the remaining central regions in the unemployment distribution (second 
and third quartile)2. The difference between the two extremes can be large. In 1996 it ranged from one and a 
half percentage points (the Netherlands) to seventeen percentage points (Italy), with ten countries out of 
thirteen3 presenting a gap of around four percentage points or more. Over time, regional differentials tend to 
increase in line with unemployment in several countries, suggesting an important role for aggregate factors, 
both cyclical and structural. Such factors need not differ across regions to result in a widening of 
unemployment differentials: if shocks that are neutral across regions result in equiproportional changes in 
unemployment, the absolute change in the high-unemployment regions will be correspondingly higher. 
However, three countries stand out as region-specific factors seem to dominate aggregate ones: Italy, 
Belgium and (post-reunification) Germany. The Netherlands, by contrast, offers the example of a sustained 
reduction of regional differentials. 
Regional unemployment is persistent in Europe in comparison with the USA. 
Irrespective of the degree of regional dispersion, in all the major European economies the regions with 
relatively higher ( or lower) levels of unemployment tend to be the same over time. This is shown by the 
simple correlations between the values of regional unemployment in a given year and the corresponding 
values for preceding years, which are high and only very slowly declining over time. (Graph 2 and Table 1). 
These data can be read as supporting the well-known thesis of persistence, that is, regional shocks in Europe 
tend to have permanent consequences on the employment and the unemployment rate because of labour 
market rigidities. By contrast, the significantly declining autocorrelation of regional unemployment over 
time in the USA fits with the characterisation of the American labour market as a model of flexibility. 
Leaving the discussion of the literature on regional unemployment in Europe and the USA to the next 
section, here we want simply to underline that persistence implies that a region's position in the 
unemployment distribution may change permanently as a result of a shock. The fact that the high-
unemployment regions tend to be the same over time may well point to differences across regions in the 
underlying determinants of long-term unemployment. 
2 Note that the regions in each group are not necessarily the same from one year to another, as the group composition for each 
year is decided by the position of regions in the unemployment distribution for that year. 
Austria was not considered in this comparison as the data on regional unemployment cover only a few years. 
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Regional factors account for a significant part the overall variation in unemployment 
Unemployment can be decomposed along an array of relevant dimensions: duration, skill, age, sex, etc. 
These dimensions are variously emphasised by the different strands of the literature seeking to explain 
European unemployment. For example, duration is emphasised by the explanations that point to the 
disenfranchisement of the long-term unemployed from the labour market; skills are key in the explanations 
based on skill-biased technical progress and the rigidity of wage differentials. It is therefore important to take 
into account these dimensions when assessing the role of the regional dimension. However, the limitations of 
our regional data set allow considering only the effect of the regional dimension as distinguished from the 
age and sex dimension4· Table 2 presents the results of a variance decomposition exercise aiming at testing 
the explanatory power of the regional dimension once account is taken of the other dimensions5· It appears 
that in a number of countries the regional variable is an independently important factor in explaining the 
dispersion in unemployment that one finds across ages, sexes, years and regions . Standard analysis of 
variance suggests that the regional factor has an important explanatory power for Germany, the United 
Kingdom, Austria, Denmark, Belgium and Italy. The results for Germany, Belgium and Italy support the 
conclusion that in these countries unemployment is significantly a regional problem (surprisingly, the 
regional factor seems to explain a significant part of the dispersion in unemployment also in West Germany). 
In the case of Austria, Denmark and the United Kingdom, the economic relevance of the result is diminished 
by the small differences that can be detected in the regional effect across regions6· 
4 
6 
Our regional data sources do not provide information on duration of unemployment and on the skill characteristics of the 
unemployed. Moreover, the age breakdown distinguishes only between the young (less than 25 years of age) and the adults (25 
years of age and older). 
Specifically, for each country, we regressed the (log of the) unemployment rates by region, age, sex and year against the 
corresponding set of regional, age, sex and year dummies. The time variable was added to capture aggregate ( cyclical or 
structural) effects. The output (shown in Table 2) includes the (share of) variance explained by the regression (adjusted R2) , the 
marginal contribution of the regional dummies to the explained variance (measured by the increase in the adjusted R 2 following 
the introduction of the regional dummies in the regression containing the other dummies) and a measure of the variability 
(standard deviation) of the regional coefficients estimated by the regression. 
The result is even less significant for Austria and Denmark, as the smaller size of the sample (due to the lower number of 
regions and, in the case of Austria , years available) reduces the precision of the estimated regional coefficients. 
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2. What can we explain on the basis of the existing literature? 
While being relatively unknown in such detail, the stylised facts presented so far correspond to the standard 
view of the EU unemployment problem. In particular, it is common to consider the persistence of regional 
unemployment differentials over time as just a specific instance of the more general fact that unemployment 
is persistent in Europe compared to the USA. 
The standard analysis in this area compares the adjustment to region-specific shocks in the EU regions to 
that in the States of the USA7. The main finding is that, while there are some differences in the adjustment 
mechanism on the wage side - with wages being relatively more rigid in Europe - the key difference appears 
to be on the labour supply side. In the case of the USA the adjustment to labour-demand shocks takes place 
mainly via migration flows, while in the EU case the response of labour supply occurs mainly via changes in 
the participation rate. As a consequence, in both cases employment levels change permanently after a shock 
to labour demand. However, in the case of the USA, because of the offsetting change in population, both the 
unemployment rate and the employment rate (i.e., the employed as a ratio to working age population) return 
to the baseline. By contrast, in the EU countries, as the population remains constant, the employment rate 
changes permanently (with some persistence also for the unemployment rate8) . 
This characterisation of the adjustment to regional shocks has played an important role in the debate on 
EMU. The lack of mobility in EU labour markets - while being a constraint on adjustment also in a national 
setting - is seen as a problem for the smooth functioning of EMU in the face of country-specific shocks. 
Without entering the debate on adjustment under EMU we wish to underline that this standard analysis has 
almost no implications for the aggregate (national) level of unemployment. This is because the region-
specific shocks by definition average out to zero at the aggregate (national) level: following such shocks 
employment rises in the regions affected by positive shocks as much as it declines in the regions hit by 
negative shocks, unemployment dispersion across the whole area increases but the total level of 
unemployment remains the same. The nature of the adjustment mechanism, whether migration flows or 
change in the participation rate, does not alter the result.9 
It can be argued that the finding that wages response to a region-specific shock is less pronounced in Europe 
than in the USA is relevant for the understanding of high and persistent unemployment in Europe relative to 
the USA, at least to the extent that rigidity at regional level translates into wage rigidity at more aggregate 
level. One of the original reasons for examining the wage determination process at the regional level was 
precisely to validate conclusions at aggregate leveJI o. However, while it is likely that some of the underlying 
reasons for wage rigidity at regional level will be producing the same result at aggregate level, between the 
two concepts there is not a perfect match. Rigidity at aggregate level tends to be lower than that at regional 
level to the extent that an aggregate negative shock lowers the workers' outside opportunities everywhere, 
7 
8 
9 
The standard references are Blanchard and Katz (1992) for the case of the USA and Decressin and Fatas (1995) for the EU case. 
The methodology of these analyses relies on a three-dimension structural Vector Autoregression (sVAR),the three variables 
being employment, unemployment and wages (or, alternatively, the participation rate) expressed as ratio of their national 
counterparts (in order to net out from the common effects of nation-wide shocks). The underlying shocks to labour demand are 
identified from the model by assuming that they solely enter directly the employment regression. 
Permanent effects on employment and unemployment are especially evident in Italy and Spain, as wages are particularly 
inflexible and the migration response negligible. The case of Spain is analysed by Jimeno and Bentolilla (1998) and Mauro and 
Spilimbergo ( 1998). 
To be more precise, an indirect link between geographical mobility and overall employment exists to the extent that greater 
mobility is conducive to a better matching process in the labour market The resulting efficiency gains, however, have to be 
offset against the costs of mobility itself. 
I O A spur to this literature was provided by Blanch flower and Oswald ( 1994). It purported to produce an estimate of the elasticity 
of wages to the local unemployment rate robust to changes in country and time (the estimated value was . I 0). Other papers 
focusing on single countries have however resulted in more differentiated values. In particular, it has been confirmed a lower 
responsiveness of wages for countries like Spain (see the discussion in Jimeno and Bentolilla, 1998) and Italy (see Casavola et 
al. , 1995). 
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which is not the case with region-specific shocks. Moreover, in drawing aggregate implications from the 
slightly weaker wages response to region-specific shocks in Europe compared with the USA, one has to bear 
in mind that the centralised bargaining system prevailing in several European countries 11 may be better apt to 
react to country-wide shocks than to localised ones. This further sets apart the effects of region-specific 
shocks from those of aggregate shocks. 
If the standard analysis at regional level does not allow firm conclusions about the determinants of 
unemployment at aggregate level a widespread perception remains nevertheless that, at least in some 
countries, the unemployment problem is a regional problem. We suggest that the focus of the standard 
analysis upon the reaction of wages and unemployment to temporary shocks, while technically appropriate 
for the identification of region-specific shocks, tends to miss the most relevant aspect of the regional aspect 
of EU unemployment. The stability over time of regional unemployment differentials suggests that they 
should be viewed as (long run) "equilibrium" phenomena. 
Regional factors can readily explain regional and overall employment performance if one postulates that the 
employment (and unemployment) response to positive and negative shocks is asymmetric across regions. In 
other words, if the same shock raises employment by less in the regions where the shock is positive than it 
reduces employment in the regions where the shock is negative, then a given distribution of regional shocks 
may have implications at the aggregate level. 
How can such an asymmetric response arise? In the following section we present a very simple model 
characterised by the presence of a country-wide wage floor, which is irrelevant for wages and employment in 
the high-wage, high productivity regions, but is "binding" in the low-wage, low-productivity regions. It is 
easy to show that, in such a case, regional shocks which are inequality increasing (i.e. negative in low-
productivity regions and positive in high-productivity regions) tend to increase aggregate unemployment. 
Moreover, the existence of a common wage floor explains why in "equilibrium" the low-productivity regions 
have higher unemployment rates than the high-productivity regions. 
Irrespective of the specific featmes of the model, the argument at its most general is one about downward 
wage stickiness. As such, it bears a resemblance to a rather ancient strand of literature, which highlighted the 
possible implications at aggregate level of the dispersion of unemployment across regions and markets. In 
this literature, the dispersion of unemployment was linked to the overall wage pressure and hence to the 
overall "natural" rate of unemployment through the non-linearity of the Phillips curve, as the upward wage 
pressure exerted by low-unemployment regions is not offset by the downward pressure from high-
unemployment regions 12· A further similarity with our reasoning may be found in the more recent literature 
on the implications of skill-biased technical progress for unemployment: if the wage curve is non linear and 
meets the demand curve in its "flat" section for the unskilled workers, a negative shift in demand for 
unskilled labour workers will not be compensated, in terms of aggregate unemployment, by a specular 
positive shift in the demand for the skilled workers 13. 
II Particularly into those countries where the centralisation of bargaining is part of a "corporatist" structure. 
12 See for instance Lipsey (1960) and Archibald (1969). The link between cross-market mismatch and the NAIRU via 
a strongly non-linear wage curve was recently reconsidered in Jackman, Layard and Nickell (1991). In the case of 
Italy Bodo and Sestito ( 1991) and Brunello et al. ( 1998) highlight a slightly different mechanism, in which the 
high-unemployment regions do not exert downward pressure on wages, as the bargaining outcome in the low-
unemployment regions only counts for wage determination (wage leadership). 
I 3 For a summary of this debate see Nickell and Bell (1995). 
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3. An illustrative model 
The purpose of the following model is to show how a country-wide wage floor may work to produce an 
equilibrium in which unemployment is permanently higher in the low-productivity regions. Such a common 
wage floor has a further potential to increase unemployment: a shock that increases the dispersion of 
productivity across regions results in a rise in both the dispersion and the average of unemployment. 
The existence of a common wage floor is derived in the model from the country's unemployment 
compensation system, in which the benefits are standardised to the wage prevailing in the median region. 
While this characterisation may correspond to the high degree of uniformity in benefits levels that is found in 
most countriesl4, it is made here only for expository convenience. What really matters is that a common 
wage floor is in place, whatever the mechanism behind it. One might easily think of alternative mechanisms, 
such as a national minimum wage, or nation-wide union pay rates. It is also plausible to suppose that, within 
a country, "fairness" considerations effectively put a limit to the extent of regional wage differentials . 
To keep the model simple, there are no links across regions in both demand and supply of labour. In 
particular, the model does not allow for migration. Essentially, allowing for a migration response to the 
differentials in wage and/or unemployment across regions would mitigate the main result of the model, that 
is , "high" ("low") unemployment in the low- (high-) productivity regions. The outflow of workers from the 
low-productivity regions would further sustain wages, reducing at the same time the unemployment rate, 
while the corresponding inflow in the high-productivity regions would ease wage pressures, as additional 
workers become available at the going wage rate. In other words, the model loses relevance if emerging 
wage and unemployment differentials elicit compensating movements in the workforce. This may provide a 
reading of the structural differences in regional unemployment between the USA and most EU countries. 
Our model is based on a variant of the standard efficiency-wage model, in which at any level of activity the 
equilibrium wage is sufficiently high to result in the level of unemployment that is necessary to minimise 
unit labour cost including the cost of shirking. More precisely, we use the Shapiro-Stiglitz ( 1984) 
formulation. In this model (see the original source for the relevant passages) the wage-determination curve 
in region i is specified as: 
wi = e + ci + r(e/q) +(s/(1-ni))(e/q) 
Where: 
wi: wage in region i 
e: effort 
ci : opportunity cost of work in region i 
r: interest rate 
q: probability of losing job when shirking 
s: probability of losing job when not shirking 
(1-ni): unemployment rate in region i 
14 While unemployment benefits tend to be indexed to the previous earnings, and therefore to be related to local wages, nation-
wide floors and ceilings frequentl y apply, which make benefits relatively uniform across regions of the same country. 
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In turn, labour demand depends on the level of productivity and wages. In its most general form: 
ni= n(wi, xi) 
Where: 
n;: employment ( as percentage of labour force) in region i 
x;: productivity in region i. 
The unemployment/wage equilibrium in each region 1s found at the intersection between the wage-
determination curve and the labour demand curve. 
Note that, for the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that the "shirking technology" is the same, that is, the 
probability of being fired if shirking and the required amount of effort do not differ across regions. Likewise, 
there are no differences in the probability of losing the job when not shirking. In other words, the equilibrium 
values of wage and unemployment differ across regions exclusively because of differences in: i) the 
opportunity cost of working (see below) and ii) the underlying level of productivity. 
The assumption of a centralised unemployment compensation system comes into play when determining the 
opportunity cost of work. Specifically, the opportunity cost of work is defined as the maximum between two 
terms: the centrally determined benefit, a locally determined alternative income. The latter in tum is a 
(concave) function of productivity and unemployment. Formally: 
C; = max{ t(X;, U;), bwm} 
with: 
otlox > 0 
ot/ou < 0 ~ auan > 0 
where: 
bwm: benefit indexed on the median-wage region 
The definition of the opportunity cost of work implies that the centrally determined benefit is relevant for 
wage determination only in those regions and at those activity levels where productivity and/or employment 
are sufficiently low to make the benefit the highest possible equivalent income available when out of work. 
Looking at the specification of the wage-determination curve, one can see that the curve is upward sloping in 
the wage-employment space, on account of both the (s/(1-n;))*( e/q) and the t(n;) terms. If, however, the t(n;) 
term is replaced by the bwm tem1, that is, the centrally determined benefit represents the opportunity cost of 
work, the wage-detern1ination curve will be initially relatively flat, as n; is small and bwm is a constant. 
Between regions, the presence of a flat section in the wage curve depends on the value of the centrally 
determined benefit relative to the local level of productivity. At one extreme, if productivity is very high 
relative to the benefit, even at low values of employment the benefit will not influence the wage curve. If, on 
the contrary, the benefit is generous in relation to productivity, the wage curve will be relatively flat over a 
wide range of employment values. The labour demand curve in tum shifts upwards and downwards with the 
level of productivity. Therefore, the intersection of the two curves is more likely to fall in the flat section of 
the wage curve, the lower the productivity level. 
By the same logic, a negative productivity shock, by extending the portion of the wage curve that is 
relatively flat and by shifting downwards the labour demand curve, will increase the likelihood that the 
equilibrium falls in the flat section of the wage curve. 
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A three-region graphical model can illustrate the effects on aggregate unemployment when the equilibrium 
in one region shifts to the flat section of the wage curve. Let the subscripts h, m, 1 denote the high-
productivity, median productivity and low-productivity region, respectively. The situation prior to the 
introduction of the centralised unemployment compensation is shown in Diagram 1, which has been drawn 
to generate the same unemployment rate in each region. In other words it is assumed that the productivity 
differentials are fully reflected by wages, with no effect on equilibrium unemployment (this being a rather 
standard characterisation of most natural rate models). Diagram 2 shows the effects of the introduction of 
unemployment compensation. It is supposed that unemployment compensation is calibrated so that the 
benefit level does not influence the wage curve of the median region at its intersection with the labour 
demand curve. The equilibrium remains unchanged, a fortiori, in the high-productivity region, where the 
benefit level is never binding. However, the equilibrium shifts in the low-productivity region, as the benefit 
level introduces a wage floor. As unemployment rises in the low-productivity region and remains constant in 
the other regions, both the national average and the regional dispersion of unemployment rise. Moreover, a 
negative correlation is created between regional unemployment and productivity, as the impact on 
unemployment is concentrated in the low-productivity region I 5. 
Building on the situation described in Diagram 2, Diagram 3 illustrates the case of an inequality-increasing 
asymmetric shock to productivity, that is, the high-productivity (low-productivity) region experiencing a 
positive (negative) shock16. Employment and wages rise in the high-productivity regions and fall in the low-
productivity regions. However, as the equilibrium falls in the flat section of the curve in the low-productivity 
region, most of the effect there occurs in terms of employment, with only a minimum impact on the wage 
level. As a result, there is a further increase in both the national average and the regional dispersion of 
unemployment and the negative correlation between regional unemployment and productivity is reinforced. 
In summing up the results of our model, we find two simple implications that should be amenable to 
empirical verification. 
Jn any given country, (long-term) productivity and unemployment are negatively correlated across regions. 
Therefore, the higher the di:,persion of regional productivity, the higher is the dispersion of regional 
unemployment. Moreover the mechanism at work is asymmetric, as the (negative) effect on employment is 
concentrated in the low-productivity regions, with little if any change in the high-productivity regions. In 
other terms, a high dispersion of regional productivity goes hand in hand with a skewed distribution of 
regional unemployment. 
A key factor behind these results is the presence of a common wage floor, which in turn is the effect of a 
centralised unemployment compensation system17 or other centralising labour market institutions. In the 
European context, in particular, centralisation is supposed to exist, to a greater or lesser extent, in each 
country but not at the European level18, which explains why the model should apply across regions and not 
across countries. 
I 5 Needless to say, because of the pro-cyclical behaviour of productivity, a short-term negative correlation between productivity 
and unemployment is a common feature of all models, where wages do not adjust immediately. The correlation discussed here 
is a long-run feature, which abstracts from cyclical fluctuation s. 
16 For simplicity, the median region does not suffer any shock and is disregarded. Moreover , the shocks in the high-productivity 
and low-productivity region are assumed to be of the same size, so that they cancel out in the aggregate. 
17 In a rather standard way, an increase in benefit generosity relative to the wage of the median region, a rise in bwm, would 
unambiguously results in higher aggregate unemployment, as unemployment raises at least in both the median and the low-
productivity region (a standard result in this kind of models). However, the effects on unemployment dispersion and skewness 
are less clear-cut, as unemployment may rise even in the most favoured region, the size of the changes in each region depending 
also on the steepness of the demand curve at the initial equi librium point. 
18 The lack of centralisation at European level is a generally accepted stylised fact. An incipient exception is possibly represented 
by Belgium, where a 1996 law sets an upward limit to collective wage increases calculated on the average of the wage increase 
in the Netherlands, France and Germany. 
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Note also that, as indicated above, the presence of compensating migratory flows would undem1ine the 
results of the model, notably the expected negative correlation between regional unemployment and 
productivity 19 · 
The implications of the model should not be over-stretched, given the extremely simple level of analysis 
adopted. Nevertheless, they suggest some clear directions for an empirical investigation of the distribution of 
regional unemployment, and of its correlation, if any, with productivity. This is the subject of the next 
section. 
19 An equilibrium with full mobility entails equalisation of expected wages across regions and hence positive correlation between 
regional unemployment and productivity, as higher wages simply compensate for a higher risk of being unemployed (Harris and 
Todaro, 1970). 
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4. An empirical investigation of the regional distribution of 
(un)employment 
We revert to our initial data set with a view to providing some empirical corroboration to the conclusions of 
the model. As these conclusions apply to long-term equilibrium, data were preliminarily averaged across two 
multi-year periods, 1991-96 and 1983-9020. 
To test the implications of the model concerning the distribution of unemployment and productivity, the 
analysis concentrates on two simple parametric measures: the coefficient of variation as a measure of 
dispersion2 1 and the difference between the average and the median unemployment rate22. We present the 
values for these parameters both for the more recent years and for the '80s. We then focus on the main 
implications of the model as presented in the previous section, to see how they fit with our empirical 
findings. 
Our initial overview of regional unemployment highlighted that regional unemployment is widely dispersed 
in some countries. This is confirmed by the measure of dispersion presented in this section. More 
interestingly, the measure of skewness indicates that the distribution of some countries is skewed toward the 
high end, with few high unemployment regions pushing up the average (national) unemployment rate. 
Our first important finding (Graph 3) therefore is that regional asymmetries in unemployment 'inflate' the 
national unemployment rate in some countries . . (Positive) skewness23 is particularly pronounced in Italy, 
Spain, Belgium and (post-reunification) Germany. The calculation on a multi-year basis and the previous 
findings on autocorrelation tend to exclude that dispersion and asymmetries are simply the result of 
asymmetries in temporary shocks. Negative skewness, that is, the representative unemployment rate 
exceeding the average unemployment rate on account of few low-unemployment regions, is a much less 
evident phenomenon. Interestingly, on a multi-year basis, the United States present moderate dispersion of 
the unemployment rate across regions, and slightly negative skewness. 
As a robustness check on the significance of this general finding, we considered a range of indicators of 
labour market performance. Considering the employment rate (more precisely we consider 1 minus the ratio 
of the employed to the working-age population) instead of the unemployment rate does not change 
significantly the relative position of countries (Graph 4). Countries showing high (low) skewness in terms of 
unemployment rate tend to show high (low) skewness in terms of employment rate. Germany and Belgium 
(and to a lesser extent Portugal) are exceptions to this pattern, as the build-up of unemployment in some 
regions is apparently not matched by particularly depressed rates of employment. In the case of Germany this 
could be explained by the historically high levels of employment associated with the planned economy in 
East Germany and the reluctance of dismissed workers (including many women) to leave the labour force. 
Breaking down the population by sex or age does not alter significantly the relative position of countries, 
particularly concerning the high-skewness countries. Regional skewness seems to be associated more with 
male than female unemployment, the most notable exception being Germany (Graph 5). 
20 The time choice was dictated by the intention to cover approximately two different cycles and the lack of a full data set for 
longer (or more recent) periods (some countries are in fact missing from the 1983-90 data) . 
21 That is, the standard deviation of regional unemployment normalised by the national average. The calculation of the standard 
deviation is unweighted, that is, regions in each countries were treated as if they had the same labour force. This simplification 
was adopted after tentative calculations showed that weighting each region by the relative share of the labour force did not yield 
significantly different results. 
22 The median unemployment rate is defined as the unemployment rate of the region containing the 501h percentile of the labour 
force. The median rate is empirical ly very similar to the average unemployment rate of the two intermediate quartiles of the 
regional unemployment distribution already presented in section 2. 
23 As positive skewness is by far more pronounced than the opposite tendency, the term skewness in the following will be used to 
indicate the average being higher than the median, unless otherwise specified. 
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This may depend on the higher propensity of unemployed men to stay in the labour force relative to women. 
In terms of age, regional skewness is considerably more pronounced among the young (less than 25 years 
old) in Italy and Belgium as well as in Portugal (Graph 6). This indicates that the build-up of unemployment 
in the depressed regions hits particularly those entering the labour force for the first time, without higher 
mobility on the part of the young acting as an offsetting tendency. In the other countries regional skewness is 
broadly similar across ages or actually higher for adults than for young people. In France, for example, 
regional skewness is completely attributable to the adults, as the young exhibit the opposite tendency. 
A second interesting finding concerns the evolution of regional asymmetries over time. 
Large regional asymmetries in unemployment have been rising since the '80s (with some exceptions). 
Compared with the '80s, regional skewness has risen in some countries and has remained stable or even 
declined in others. However, the problem of the countries that can be considered as suffering from an 
'excess' of unemployment in some regions seems to have grown worse over time (Graph 7). In the case of 
Germany the obvious explanation is reunification. For Belgium, Spain and Italy in particular this suggests 
the occurrence of shocks increasing inequality across regions, which regional and labour market policies 
have not been able to offset (or may even have aggravated, by reinforcing wage floors) . By contrast, the 
Netherlands seems to present the situation of a country where significant regional asymmetries in 
unemployment have been reabsorbed since the '80s, suggesting that development in the economy and 
policies have been conducive to a reduction of regional inequalities. 
Comparing across time the indicator of regional dispersion gives broadly the same message: dispersion has 
increased in countries where it was already high (Graph 8). Spain is the only country showing high and 
increasing skewness but declining dispersion. 
We now tum to the implications of the model concerning the relationship between the regional distributions 
of productivity and unemployment. It will be remembered from the discussion at the end of the previous 
section that these implications depend on the presence of centralising labour market institutions (resulting in 
wage floors) and on the absence of compensating migratory flows. While both conditions seem fairly 
plausible in the European context, they were not properly verified (see 'open issues' below) and therefore the 
following results cannot be taken as a full testing of the model. The results can be sununarised as follows . 
Regional asymmetries in unemployment are associated with productivity differentials within countries. The 
correlation between regional skewness of unemployment and regional dispersion in per-capita GDP is 
positive and (weakly) significant24 . The relationship holds both for the '80s and the '90s (Graphs 9 and 10). 
Unemployment is negatively correlated with productivity within (some) countries, but no correlation exists 
across countries. At regional level, a number of European countries present a negative correlation between 
unemployment and productivity (GDP per worker) (Table 3). The result holds for most countries if one 
excludes the regions that coincide with the capital. The exclusion can be justified if one considers the 
peculiar role of the capital, which are more likely to attract the more risk-prone individuals (looking for a 
better rewarding even if more risky career). Moreover, in the capital there is in general a large weight of the 
public sector, whose presence may impart an upward bias to the GDP measure and may further act to attract 
job seekers. The negative relationship is statistically significant, however, only for a few countries. At 
European level, by contrast, no correlation is found between unemployment and productivity across 
countries. This also corresponds to the expected result, as the negative correlation between employment and 
productivity is due to centralising institutions that supposedly operate within countries but not across 
countries. 
The above findings offer some suggestive evidence in favour of the thesis that attributes the worsening of the 
unemployment situation in some countries to the existence of different regional economies coupled with 
centralised institutions. It also tend to back the intuition that the problem may have become more serious in 
recent times, as regional gaps have increased in a number of countries while convergence was generally 
occurring across countries in the EU. The analysis, however, has serious limitations, which leave a number 
of issues open. They are briefly discussed below. 
24 The stati stical inference is made difficult by the very small number of countries considered, particularly for the first period here 
examined. 
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As already indicated, there is no control for the degree of centralisation of labour market and other social 
institutions. A meaningful measure of centralisation remains elusive, especially if one wants to include not 
only bargaining institutions but also other characteristics such as those of the welfare state. The available 
indicators tend to suggest that European countries are all relatively centralised (Table 4). For example, the 
United Kingdom, which has the most decentralised bargaining structure, appears to operate a strongly 
centralised welfare system when taking account of the widespread use of means-tested minima set at national 
level. It was not possible, however, to establish any significant correlation between any such indicator of 
centralisation, or combination of them, and the characteristics of the regional distribution of unemployment. 
Similarly, there is no control for the degree of geographical mobility. A problem is that the variable that 
should be considered is not actual mobility, which presumably reflects wage and unemployment differentials 
and hence is endogenously determined, but the underlying propensity to move. Introducing the percentage of 
owner occupied houses, as a proxy of the (non-) propensity to move25 does not affect the relationship 
between the regional dispersion and skewness of unemployment and the regional productivity dispersion. 
The experiment, however, is not conclusive, since it may simply indicate that the variable here considered 
does not fully capture the propensity to move ( otherwise it should have had an impact on unemployment 
dispersion) . 
Finally, a number of caveats concern the limitations of the data here used. 
The country sample is restricted and the regional characteristics are not observed in homogeneous units. The 
EU focus of the study, dictated also by the availability of data, means that one deals with a relatively small 
number of countries, ranging from 14 to .... depending on the data and the period, often with relatively similar 
characteristics. Moreover, in spite of the care taken in defining the regions, their size remains markedly 
different both within and across countries. 
Data limitations are particularly severe for data other than those on the labour force, in particular those on 
regional productivity26· In principle, one would need to measure the underlying productivity, that is, a 
measure of productivity that is independent from the endogenous determination of wages and 
(un)employment. Indicators that may serve as an independent instrument to measure the underlying 
productivity of a region (such as productive infrastructure endowment) are not consistently available at 
regional level. In practice, one has to deal with two measures of actual productivity, which are likely to be 
biased in opposite directions: the per capita GDP is algebraically lowered by unemployment, while the GDP 
per worker is boosted by the exclusion ofleast productive workers in the high unemployment regions. 
Moreover, the fact that GDP data are not necessarily consistent with labour force data, which are the sole 
source of employment figures at regional level, suggests against a systematic use of GDP per worker 
calculated as the ratio of GDP to employment. For these reasons, we have chosen to consider the GDP per 
worker when looking at the correlation between unemployment and productivity of each region (so as to 
avoid the risk of ending up with an "algebrical" correlation) and the GDP per capita when considering the 
productivity dispersion for a whole country. 
25 The data here used have been deri ved from Maclellan et al. (1998), who make use of several different sources. The argument behind the use of 
such a variable as proxy of the propensity to move is that already stated by Oswald (1996). Some evidence, for the Italian case, on the link 
between such a variable and actual migration flows (controlling for income differentials) has been reported by Cannari et al. ( 1997). 
26 Also for labour force data problems may derive from the fact that most low productivity regions tend to be (at least in some countries) 
agricultural regions, where the agricultural sector still hides under-utilised work resources (so reducing the amount of negati ve correlation 
between productivity and (measured) unemployment across the regions of a given country). 
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5. Some policy conclusions in the EMU context 
This paper has not directly addressed the issues commonly associated with EMU. It is not difficult, however, 
to draw some policy conclusions that are relevant for EMU. 
EMU implies that the same monetary policy applies in all the countries of the euro area. This will boost the 
integration of the financial and productive environments. The participating countries will therefore tend to 
resemble regions of a single economic entity. 
These features have marked the debate on the costs and benefits of EMU. The benefits are reckoned to 
include the efficiency gains from further economic integration and increased monetary stability. The costs 
essentially depend on the losses from the elimination of the intra-euro exchange rates as adjustment 
mechanism in case of idiosyncratic (i.e., country-specific) shocks. Much of the EMU debate has therefore 
revolved around the importance of idiosyncratic national shocks ( or idiosyncratic effects of common shocks) 
and the presence of other adjustment mechanisms. The standard analytical framework is that of the "optimal 
currency area", in which the relevant aspects are: a) the relative size of idiosyncratic and non-idiosyncratic 
shocks27, b) the degree of flexibility of product and labour markets28, c) the presence of other shock 
absorbers, related either to assets diversification or to fiscal transfers. 
Concerning fiscal transfers an argument has often been made that the small weight of the European budget relative 
to national budgets - at present and in the foreseeable future - poses an obstacle to a smooth functioning of EMU. 
A better institutional design, so as to strengthen fiscal policy co-ordination across Member States, may 
undoubtedly facilitate the functioning of EMU. However, in assessing the role of fiscal policy one must take 
into account other shock-absorbers, which may be actually enhanced by EMU. For instance, better financial 
integration and the absence of exchange rate risk may favour a process of assets diversification, which may 
itself provide an automatic, market-driven shock-absorbing mechanism. One has also to consider the 
potential advantages of the constraints on fiscal policy. Actually, keeping low the weight of the European 
budget (and constraining the opportunities for free-riding behaviour on the part of national governments) is 
part of a stability-oriented macroeconomic framework. Moreover, limiting the role of the European level of 
government is consistent with a strategy to keep decisions and actions as close as possible to the actual 
problems and the relevant information flows. 
This strategic argument in favour of the subsidiarity principle appears particularly well founded in the 
employment domain, given the prevailing structural nature of European unemployment and the diversity of 
the structural constraints present in the different countries. This paper provides a further reason why policy 
centralisation should be resisted when dealing with unemployment. It is based on an empirical investigation 
of the characteristics of regional unemployment in the EU. This suggests that some countries may suffer 
from "excessively" centralised labour markets in relation to their large interregional productivity 
differentials. Specifically, regulations decided at national level, often tailored to the conditions of the median 
region, may have created a wage floor in the less productive regions, turning them into high-unemployment 
regions. In other words, we suggest that an excessive degree of centralisation may already exist in current 
national settings. This leads to an important policy conclusion in the context of EMU. As differences across 
regions Europe-wide are greater than within any individual country, centralisation of labour market 
institutions at European level and especially wage equalisation should be in general be resisted. This argues, 
for instance, against the adoption of a "social snake" or "corridor model" for EU social policy, whereby 
individual social benefits or aggregate social expenditure in EU Member States would not be allowed to fall 
below certain income-related standards29. The perspective of the enlargement to the countries of Central and 
27 Taking into account of the degree of persistence, as the more persistent the shock, the less use there is for the exchange-rate as 
shock-absorbe r. The distribution of shocks is also likely to be affected by the integration of financial and productive 
environments. 
28 In terms of both price and wage flexibility and cross-country mobility of workers and firms. 
29 For details of the "social snake" and the "corridor model" for EU social policy see, respectively, Dispersyn and Van der Vost 
( 1990) and Busch ( 1998). 
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Eastern Europe, where levels of development and social protection evolution differ substantially from those 
of the current Member States, further reinforces the argument against excessive social harmonisation30_ 
Needless to say, there are other aspects that should be taken into account when discussing the "correct size" 
of the government, both at national and at European level. These include a range of ethical and political 
issues, which are ultimately encapsulated in the question of "who is us?" This paper does not touch such 
issues. Its only claim is that, whatever the constraints placed by the answer that is given to the question of 
national and European identity, social and employment policies should pay the greatest possible attention to 
the diversity of local conditions. 
This conclusion is not invalidated by the well-known argument that a stronger co-ordination in unions' 
bargaining may positively affect macroeconomic performance3 1. In the European context of wide national 
differences in the strength and role of unions, the same argument can be used to highlight the dangers of less 
than complete co-ordination of bargaining under EMU conditions. Specifically, EMU might conceivably have 
divergent implications for unions' behaviour in Germany and in the other member countries. In the latter, 
elimination of the devaluation option might render more stringent the external discipline that was already 
indirectly supplied by the Bundesbank through the ERM. In Germany, by contrast, unions might feel to be 
less constrained under EMU conditions than in the previous framework, where the Bundesbank was more 
immediately concerned with their wage demands32. In principle, increased co-ordination of bargaining at 
supranational level might offer a remedy against the emergence of such a divergence. However, the extent of 
the differences across national industrial relations systems makes the task of efficient co-ordination extremely 
difficult. The alternative of moving towards more decentralisation might be therefore more appealing, 
particularly in the light of the increased importance, in the new EMU environment, of local/structural shocks, 
vis-a-vis macro/aggregate ones, which adds to the advantages of a more decentralised system. Whatever the 
relative merits of bargaining centralisation and decentralisation (an issue well beyond the aim of this paper), 
the conclusion that we wish to stress is that supra-national co-ordination should avoid a (premature) 
homogeneisation of wages and working conditions across countries that are (still) extremely differentiated. 
Our diagnosis of regional unemployment as the result of excessive centralisation does not imply that the only 
policy recipe is that of flexibilisation of the employment regimes along regional lines. If low-productivity 
regions are disproportionally penalised by wage floors resulting from national institutions, regional policies 
focused on the least productive regions may have an important aggregate effect even on unemployment. 
Specifically, in the context of our model, productivity-enhancing measures that raise labour demand at any 
given level of wages, are particularly effective, in terms of employment, in the least productive regions, 
where the equilibrium unemployment tends to fall in the flat section of the wage curve, and hence gains in 
employment can be obtained with little pressure on wages. In other words, the regional dimension of 
unemployment in the EU (or at least in some EU countries) calls for a two-handed approach, enhancing both 
flexibility and productivity in the less favoured regions. Needless to say, stating that there is a potential role 
for well-designed regional policies does not imply that the regional policies so far conducted have been 
effective. Moreover, their effectiveness should be judged not only in terms of their impact on productivity , 
but also in the light of the need to avoid negative side-effects on wage flexibility. Assessing the existing 
policies is well beyond the aim of this paper. Here it suffices to say that the ( difficult) task is that of 
designing policies which are cost-effective at the micro level and which, at the same time, have only limited 
spill-over effects on the reservation wages of the unemployed (for instance, avoiding to create long queues of 
job applicants to the subsidised firms). Such a combination might even require some form of 
"conditionality", so that the regional aid is made conditional upon budgetary and wage discipline. 
30 For a review of issues surrounding social harmonisation in relation to the enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe see Bean et 
al. ( 1998). 
31 The classical formulation of this argument is found in Calmfors and Driffill (1988). 
32 This is because the ECB would react to any German unions ' 'misbehaviour' only to the extent that the average of the euro-area 
is going to be affected. The perception of such a lesser concern might induce German unions to put forward excess ive wage 
claims. The risk would be less important for smaller countries, where the unions would feel too small to escape the discipline of 
increased competition in the euro-area. For related considerations on the interactions between the ECB and different national 
bargaining settings see Calmfors ( 1998) and Soskice and Iverson ( 1998). 
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Graph 1: Regional unemployment: evolution over time 
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Graph 2: Regional unemployment: autocorrelation over timijl 
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(1) Correlation between regional unemployment rates in year t and previous years. 
Year t is 1996 for all countries except USA for which it is 1991 . 
Source: Authors elaboration on Eurostat data (CRONOS database) 
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Table 1: Regional unemployment: autocorrelation over time 
Countries Average t/t-1 Average t/t-1 1992-1996 1988-1992 1984-1988 
correlation in correlation in correlation correlation correlation 
1984-1996 1988-199633 
Belgium .984 .994 .989 .991 .848 
Denmark .968 .969 .927 .984 .975 
Greece n.a. .840 .665 n.a. 
France . 974 .974 .849 .977 .884 
Italy .965 .984 .983 .982 .895 
Spain .947 .883 .942 .897 
Portugal n.a. .961 .845 .966 n.a. 
Netherlands n.a. .841 .869 n.a. 
Ireland n.a. .398 .399 n.a . n.a. 
Germany n.a. .979 . 966 n.a. n.a. 
Germany (W) .989 .989 .966 .990 .934 
Sweden n.a. .949 .906 n.a. n.a. 
Austria n.a. .976 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
United .984 .978 .925 .995 .954 
Kingdom 
Source: Authors elaboration on Eurostat data (CRONOS database) 
33 1991-96 for Germany; 1993-96 for Austria. 
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1984-1996 
correlation 
.7 17 
.771 
n.a . 
.768 
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Table 2: Regional unemployment: variance decomposition34 
Countries Dispersion Share of Properties of the 
Among the variance statistical model 
regional explained by 
dummies regional 
coefficients dummies 
Total Sample 
adj . R2 period 
Belgium .1437 .191 .887 83-97 
Denmark .0847 .209 .810 83-97 
Greece .1469 .081 .352 88-97 
France .0210 .001 .787 83-97 
Italy .2224 .197 .925 83-90 
Spain .1136 .106 .861 83-90 
Portugal .1764 .179 .833 86-97 
Netherlands .0692 .107 .746 88-97 
Ireland .06 163 .052 .338 88-97 
Germany .1788 .557 .834 91-972 
Germany (West) .1559 .495 .801 83-90 
.1445 .421 .782 83-972 
Sweden .07 13 .063 .930 93-97 
Austria .1075 .226 .899 94-97 
United Kingdom .13 10 .31 9 .810 83-97 
Source: Authors elaboration on Eurostat data (CRONOS database) 
34 The tab le reports the results of an analysis of variance exercise where the log of the unemployment rate for each age 
group (people younger or older than 25 years of age), sex, region and year - within each country - has been regressed on 
a fu ll set of yearly, age-group, sex and region dummies. The first column reports the standard deviation of the estimated 
coefficients of the latter. The second column reports the change in the adjusted R3 obtained including those region 
dummies (in a model where al I the other effects are already present). The thi rd and fo urth columns respective ly report 
2 
the adjusted R2 of the complete model and the sample period utilised in the estimates. 
Excluding 1995 and 1996. 
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Diagram 1: Regional labour markets without wage floors 
Diagram 2: Regional labour markets with wage floors 
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Diagram 3: Regional labour markets with wage floors and inequality 
increasing demand shock. 
Some Unpleasant Arithmetics of Regional Unemployment in the EU 32 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Graph 3: Regional unemployment: skewness and dispersion (1) (1991-1996) 
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(1) Skewness is defined as the difference between the mean and the median; the dispersion is the coefficient of variation. 
2) 1980-1991 . 
Source: Authors elaboration on Eurostat data (CRONOS database) 
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Graph 4: Regional unemployment and non-employment: skewness <1) (1991-1996) 
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(2) The employment rate is the ratio of the employed to the working age (14-65) population . The non-employment rate equals one minus the employment rate. 
Source: Authors elaboration on Eurostat data (CRONOS database) 
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Graph 5: Regional unemployment by sex: skewness (1) (1991-1996) 
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Source: Authors elaboration on Eurostat data (CRONOS database) 
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Graph 6: Regional unemployment by age: skewness 111 (1991-1996) 
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(1) Skewness is defined as the difference between the mean and the median. 
(2) Young: less than 25 years of age. Adult: 25 years of age and over. 
Source: Authors elaboration on Eurasia! data (CRONOS database) 
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Graph 7: Regional unemployment: skewness 
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(1) the skewness is the difference between the mean and the median 
Source: Authors elaboration on Eurostat data (CRONOS database) 
Some Unpleasant Arithmetics of Regional Unemployment in the EU 
1983-1990 
- - - - - - - - -
(1) (1983-1990, 1991-1996 periods) 
37 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Graph 8: Regional unemployment: dispersion (1) (1983-1990,1991-1996 periods) 
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Graph 9: Regional unemployment and GDP per capita: skewness and dispersion 
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Graph 10: Regional Unemployment and GDP per capita: skewness and dispersion (1980s) 
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Table 3 : Regional productivity regressed against regional unemployment3s 
(:ountry Coefficient Intercept Ad,j.R.2 
Belgium 0.0079 (0.0935) 7.9338 (1 .9594) -0.1100 
Exel. Brussels -0.2360 (-1.7044) 18.1257 (3.0150)* 0.1747 
Denmark 0.0714 (1.561156) 5.5306 (2.8284)* 0.0931 
Exel. Copenhagen 0.2038 (1.742861) 0.7243 (0.1623) 0.1451 
Germany -0.1391 (-3.0387)* 13.424 7 (6. 7138)* 0.1780 
Exel. Berlin -0.1505 (-3.2107)* 14.0926 (6.8299)* 0.2054 
Greece -0.0845 (-0.3781) 8.9634 (1.9195) -0.0769 
Exel. Athens -0.0612 (-0.2919) 8.8777 (2.0089) -0.0907 
Spain 0.0598 (0.2057) 17.9294 (1.7413) -0.0597 
Exel. Madrid 0.2009 (0.6536) 13.3914 (1.2453) -0.0371 
France 0.0137 (0.1408) 10.8821 (2.5001 )* -0.0466 
Exel. Paris (id/) 0.1957 (1.3837) 3.0655 (0.4956) 0.0417 
Exel. Corsica -0.1045 (-1.1342) 15.8302 (3.8854 )* 0.0134 
Exel. Corsica and Paris -0.0921 (-0.5013) 15.2995 (-0.0388) -0.0388 
(id/) 
Ireland 0.0856 (1.2674) 11.0791 (5.0753) 0.0797 
Exel. Dublin 0.3839 (0.3783) 12.4333 (4.0161)* -0.1665 
Italy -0.6678 (-3.6434 )* 38.6522 (4.9813)* 0.4054 
Exel. Rome (Latium) -0.7044 (-3.6727)* 39.9813 (4.9657)* 0.4235 
Netherlands -0.0078 (-0.1602) 6.8697 (3.5883)* -0.0971 
Austria 0.0114 (0.3147) 3.5635 (2.3027) -0.1269 
Exel. Vienna 0.0690 (0.9486) 1.3939 (0.4915) -0.0144 
Portugal 0.0119 (0.0350) 5.7025 (1 .1164) -0.1997 
Exel. Lisbon 0.07 48 (0.1262) 4.8653 (0.5853) -0.2450 
Finland -0.1823 (-0.4024) 20.8210 (1.1165) -0.2013 
United Kingdom 0.0913 (0.9308) 5.9521 (1 .9872) -0.0037 
Exel. London 0.1991 (1.4238) 2.7849 (0.6649) 0.0285 
Sweden -0.0430 (-0.2298) 9.8270 (1.2132) -0.1564 
Exel. Stockholm 0.5097 (2.6580)* -13.3609 (-1.6443) 0.5026 
EU (countries) -0.0905 (-0.8361) 12.8564 (2.8986)* -0.0219 
EU excl. Lux 0.0099 (0.0760) 9.3887 (1.84 72) -0.0828 
35 OLS estimate on 1991-1996 averages. T-statistics in parenthesis (an asterisk indicates the result is 
significant at the 5% level). 
Source: Authors elaboration on Eurostat data (CRONOS database) 
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Table 4: Indicators of centralisation of labour market institutions 
Centralisation of bargaining Minimum wage Means tested Share of public sector Share of public sector 
institutions relative to median UB employment on total employment on working 
low wage (1997) expenditure employment age population 
(% ofUB 
expenditure) 
Bargaining Centralisation Mid Early Mid 
coverage '90s '80s '90s 
Mid '90s Early '80s Mid '90s Early 
'80s 
Austria 98 98 2 2 18.75 2.9 19.0 14.0 
Belgium 90 90 2 2 83 .9 0 19.1 20.1 10.6 
Denmark 69 69 2 3 0 31.0 30.1 22.2 
Finland 95 95 2 3 14.94 24.7 19.5 14.6 
France 95 85 2 2 35 .2 6.49 24.1 22.0 14.3 
Germany (W) 92 91 2 2 13.25 15.8 15 .3 10.1 
Greece - - - - 10.0 9.0 5.4 
Ireland - - 2 2 7.2 17.2 17.8 9.3 
Italy 82 85 2.5 1.5 0 15.9 15.0 9.2 
Netherlands 81 76 2 2 83.1 40.66 13.6 15.7 7.0 
Portugal 71 70 2 2 20.69 17.7 12.5 11.4 
Spain 78 76 2 2 66.6 25 .69 14.6 11.0 6.7 
Sweden 89 86 2 3 0 31.8 32.2 23.8 
UK 47 70 1 2 47.22 16.7 21.9 11.3 
Source: Elaboration of the authors on various sources. 
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7. Statistical Appendix 
All the figures used in the calculations are from Eurostat and the time period covered depends 
on the availability of updated data. 
The regions in the panel were chosen mainly according to the following basic principles: 
- availability of figures at NUTS3 level; 
- relative homogeneity of size in terms of population; 
- respect of administrative borders within the countries. 
F h or t e purposes o f 'd d h fi JI I 1 t' our ea cu a 10n we cons1 ere t e o owmg regions: 
Country Regions 
Belgium NUTS2 except for Reg. Bruxelles-Cap for 
which we used NUTS 1 
Denmark NUTS3 
Germany NUTS2 except for Brandeburg, Bremen, 
Hamburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommem, 
Sachsesn, Thueringen, Saarland, Schleswig-
Holstein for which we used NUTS 1 and for 
Berlin for which we have used NUTS3 
Greece NUTS2 except for Attiki for which we used 
NUTS! 
Spain NUTS2 except for Madrid and Canarias for 
which we used NUTS 1 
France NUTS2 except for Ile-de-France and Nord-
Pas-De-Calais for which we used NUTS3 
Ireland NUTS3 
Italy NUTS2 except for Lombardia, Emilia-
Romagna Lazio, Abruzzo-Molise Campania, 
Sicilia and Sardegna for which we used 
NUTSl 
The Netherlands NUTS2 
Austria NUTS2 
Portugal NUTS2 except for Ayores and Madeira for 
which we used NUTS 1 
Finland NUTS2 except for Ahvenanmaa/ Aaland for 
which we have used NUTS I 
Sweden NUTS2 
United Kingdom NUTS2 except for East Anglia for which we 
used NUTS3 and for Northern Ireland for 
which we used NUTS 1 
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As for unemployment rates in the '90s the basic principle was to interpolate missing data 
according to the behaviour of the variable in the preceding years. As for the '80s instead (since 
missing data are much more frequent) the time period covered in calculations is shorter 
whenever figures for at least one region were not available; in particular we considered these 
time periods for the following countries: 
Countries Time period used in unemployment 
calculations (80s) 
Greece 1988-1990 
Ireland 1988-1990 
The Netherlands 1988-1990 
Portugal 1986-1990 
Moreover for Germany the calculations refer to unified Germany for the '90s and to West 
Germany only for the ' 80s. 
As for employment rates, figures on active population (15-64) were not available at NUTS3 
level ; so we used estimates built on the basis of the ratio between active and total population of 
the corresponding region at NUTS2 level. 
As for productivity in the '90s (per capita GDP and GDP per worker) the dispersion indicator 
is the weighted coefficient of variation and the time period is shorter (1991-1994) because 
more updated figures were not available. 
In the case of France we used aggregate figures for the regions Ile-de-France and Nord-pas-de-
Calais and for Ireland the time period is 1991-1993. 
As for the '80s the time period is shorter in many cases: Denmark (1988-1990), The 
Netherlands ( 1986-1990), Austria ( 1988-1990), Sweden (1985-1990) and United Kingdom 
(1987-1990). 
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I BELGIQUE-BELGIE DANMARK DEUTSCHLAND 
REG. BRUXELLES-CAP, KOEBENHA VN OG FREDERIKS,KOM STUITGART 
BRUSSELS HFDST. GEW, KOEBENHA VNS AMT KARLSRUHE 
I ANTWERPEN FREDERIKSBORG AMT FREIBURG LIMBURG (B) ROSKILDE AMT TUEBINGEN 
OOST-VLAANDEREN VESTSJAELLANDS AMT OBERBAYERN 
I VLAAMS BRABANT STORSTROEMS AMT NIEDERBA YERN WEST-VLAANDEREN BORNHOLMS AMT OBERPFALZ BRABANT WALLON FYNSAMT OBERFRANKEN 
HAINAUT SOENDERJYLLANDS AMT MIITELFRANKEN 
I LIEGE RIBEAMT UNTERFRANKEN LUXEMBOURG (B) VEJLEAMT SCHWABEN 
NAMUR RINGKOEBING AMT BERLIN-WEST, STADT 
I AARHUSAMT BERLIN-OST, STADT VIBORGAMT BRANDENBURG NORDJYLLANDS AMT BREMEN 
HAMBURG 
I DARMSTADT GIESSEN 
KASSEL 
I MECKLENBURG-VORPOMMERN BRAUNSCHWEIG HANNOVER 
LUENEBURG 
I WESER-EMS DUESSELDORF 
KOELN 
I MUENSTER DETMOLD ARNSBERG 
KOBLENZ 
I TRIER RHEINHESSEN-PF ALZ 
SAARLAND 
I 
SACHSEN 
DESSAU 
HALLE 
MAGDEBURG 
I SCHLESW!G-HOLSTEIN THU ERIN GEN 
I ELLADA ESPANA FRANCE 
ANATOLIKI MAKEDON!A, GALICIA PARIS 
I THRAKI ASTURIAS SEIN E- ET-MARNE KENTR!KI MAKEDONIA CANTABR!A YVELINES 
DYT!Kl MAKEDONIA PAIS VASCO ESSONNE 
I THESSALIA 
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lPEIROS NAVARRA HAUTS-DE-SEINE 
IONIANISIA RIOJA SEINE-SAINT-DENIS 
I DYTfKI ELLADA ARAGON V AL-DE-MARNE STEREA ELLADA MADRID VAL-D'OISE 
PELOPONNISOS CASTILLA-LEON CHAMPAGNE-ARDENNE 
I ATTfKI CASTILLA-LA MANCHA PICARDIE VOREIO AIGAIO EXTREMA DURA HAUTE-NORMANDIE 
NOTIO AIGAIO CATALUNA CENTRE 
KRITI COMUNIDAD VALENCIANA BASSE-NORMANDIE 
I BALEARES BOURGOGNE ANDALUCIA NORD 
MURCIA PAS-DE-CALAIS 
I CEUT A Y MELILLA LORRAINE CANARIAS ALSACE 
FRAN CHE-COMTE 
PAYS DE LA LOIRE 
I BRETAGNE POITOU-CHARENTES 
AQUITAINE 
I MIDI-PYRENEES LIMOUSIN RHONE-ALP ES 
AUVERGNE 
I LANGUEDOC-ROUSSILLON PROVENCE-ALPES-COTE 
D'AZUR 
I CORSE 
IRELAND ITALIA NEDERLAND 
I BORDER PIEMONTE GRONINGEN 
DUBLIN VALLE D'AOSTA FRIESLAND 
I MID-EAST LIGURIA DRENTHE MIDLAND LOMBARDIA OVERIJSSEL MID-WEST TRENTINO-AL TO ADI GE GELDERLAND 
SOUTH-EAST (IRL) FRIULI-VENEZIA GIULIA FLEVOLAND 
I SOUTH-WEST (IRL) VENETO UTRECHT WEST EMILIA-ROMAGNA NOORD-HOLLAND 
TOSCANA ZUID-HOLLAND 
I UMBRIA ZEELAND MARCHE NOORD-BRABANT LAZIO LIMBURG (NL) 
ABRUZZO-MOUSE 
I 
I CAMPANIA PUGLIA BASILICA TA 
CALABRIA 
I SICILIA SARDEGNA 
I 
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OESTERREICH 
BURGENLAND 
NIEDEROESTERREICH 
WIEN 
KAERNTEN 
STEIERMARK 
OBEROESTERREICH 
SALZBURG 
TIROL 
VORARLBERG 
SVERIGE 
STOCKHOLM 
OESTRA MELLANSVERIGE 
SMAALAND MEO OEARNA 
SYDSVERIGE 
V AESTSVERIGE 
NORRA MELLANSVERIGE 
MELLERST 
OEVRE NORRLAND 
PORTUGAL 
NORTE 
CENTRO (P) 
LISBOA E VALE DO TEJO 
ALENTEJO 
ALGARVE 
ACORES 
MADEIRA 
UNITED KINGDOM 
CLEVELAND, DURHAM 
CUMBRIA 
NORTHUMBERLAND, TYNE AND WEAR 
HUMBERSIDE 
NORTH YORKSHIRE 
SOUTH YORKSHIRE 
WEST YORKSHIRE 
DERBYSHIRE 
LEICS, NORTHAMPTONSHIRE 
LINCOLNSHIRE 
CAMBRIDGESHIRE 
NORFOLK 
SUFFOLK 
BEDFORDSHIRE; HERTFORDSHIRE 
BERKS,, BUCKS,, OXFORDSHIRE 
SURREY, EAST-WEST SUSSEX 
ESSEX 
GREATER LONDON 
HAMPSHIRE, ISLE OF WIGHT 
KENT 
AVON, GLOUCS, WILTSHIRE 
CORNWALL, DEVON 
DORSET, SOMERSET 
HEREFORD WORCS, 
WAR WICKS, 
SHROPSHIRE 
STAFFORDSHIRE 
WEST MILAND (COUNTY) 
CHESHIRE 
GREATER MANCHESTER 
LANCASHIRE 
MERSEYSIDE 
CLWYD, DYFED, GWYNEDD, POWYS 
GWENT, MID-S-W 
GLAMORGAN 
BORD,-CENTR,-FIFE-LOTH,-TAY, 
DUMFR,-GALLOWAY, STRATHCLYDE 
HIGHLANDS, ISLANDS 
GRAMPIAN 
NORTHERN IRELAND 
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SUOMI/FINLAND 
ETELAE-SUOMI 
ITAE-SUOMI 
VAEL!-SUOMI 
POHJOIS-SUOMI 
AHVENANMAA / AALAND 
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